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AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD: A CALL 
FOR IMPARTIALITY IN THE LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSION COUNCIL’S DISABILITY 
ACCOMMODATION REVIEW PROCESS 
Edward Dunn* 
Abstract: Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 
1990, endeavoring to eliminate discrimination against disabled Americans 
and assure equality of opportunity. The Law School Admission Council’s 
(LSAC) accommodation review process contradicts this purpose when it 
denies disabled individuals seeking accommodation on the Law School 
Admission Test (LSAT). In its current state, this review process enables 
LSAC to issue denials without affording the disabled applicants an oppor-
tunity to be heard or to confront adverse witnesses. These omissions fail 
to meet procedural due process standards, but LSAC, as a non-profit, pri-
vate corporation, is not compelled to meet these standards unless its mo-
nopolistic and coercive position over law school applicants qualifies its 
conduct as public in character. This Note argues that if the purpose of the 
ADA is to be fully realized, LSAC should implement an impartial appel-
late review process for disputes arising from accommodation requests by 
disabled individuals. 
Introduction 
 Abby Rothberg noticed that she was different in the second grade 
when she could not read like the rest of her peers.1 Two years later, a 
psychologist diagnosed her with a learning disability based on her 
processing speed, confirming her suspicions.2 Rothberg’s school dis-
trict provided her with various accommodations, including extended 
time on tests, throughout the course of her elementary and secondary 
education, enabling her to succeed academically.3 
 
 
* Executive Note Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–
2013). 
1 See Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (Rothberg I ), 300 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 
1095 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d, 102 F. App’x 122 (10th Cir. 2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 1095–96. Rothberg received an Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) in accor-
dance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Id. Recognizing that the 
educational needs of students with disabilities were not being adequately met, Congress en-
acted IDEA to ensure “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
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 Rothberg took both the SAT and the ACT before applying to col-
lege.4 She took the SAT without an extended time accommodation and 
scored a 960, placing her in the 38th percentile of those who took the 
test.5 Rothberg received 50% additional time to complete the ACT and 
scored a 25, placing her in the 82nd percentile.6 She matriculated to 
Syracuse University and received accommodations throughout her col-
lege education.7 By the start of her senior year, she had earned a grade 
point average of 3.3 out of 4.0.8 
 During her senior year, Rothberg decided to continue her educa-
tion by attending law school.9 She registered for the Law School Admis-
sion Test (LSAT) and applied to the Law School Admission Council 
(LSAC) for the accommodation of fifty percent additional time.10 
LSAC denied her request, claiming that her documentation did not 
establish her disability.11 Rothberg took the LSAT in October 2003 
without any accommodation.12 Hindered by her disability, she could 
not complete a significant portion of the test and resorted to randomly 
selecting answers for approximately one-third of the multiple-choice 
questions.13 As a result, she scored a 148, placing her in the 38th per-
centile.14 
 Unsatisfied with her score, Rothberg decided to take the LSAT 
again and registered for the December 2003 test.15 She again at-
tempted to secure an accommodation for the test and addressed 
LSAC’s concerns regarding the documentation of her disability.16 She 
                                                                                                                      
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006); see 
also Edward Dunn, Comment, The Ninth Circuit’s Redundant Remand in E.M. v. Pajaro Unified 
Valley School District Sends an Important Message, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. E. Supp. 11, 21 
(2012), http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/lawreviews/journals/bcjlsj/32_ 
e_supp/02_Dunn.pdf (“Thus, IDEA’s express purpose is to ensure that every child with a 
disability has equal access to education.”). 
4 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. 
11 See id. Rothberg included in her initial request to LSAC a letter from her high 
school IEP case manager that stated she had been diagnosed with a processing speed 
learning disability and that extended time on tests was essential for her success. See id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 1098. 
16 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. 
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underwent a neuropsychological evaluation, conducted by a clinical 
psychologist experienced in learning disabilities, to obtain an assess-
ment of her disability and a recommendation for taking standardized 
tests.17 This evaluation confirmed Rothberg’s learning disability and 
concluded that because of her weak processing speed, it took her sig-
nificantly longer “‘than the majority of her peers to complete the same 
volume of material.’”18 The evaluation recommended that Rothberg 
receive extended time to complete all standardized tests to account for 
her disability.19 
 Rothberg submitted the report to LSAC as part of her application 
for an accommodation on the December 2003 LSAT.20 LSAC did not 
dispute the psychologist’s qualifications to make such a recommenda-
tion, but denied the request because the psychologist did not adminis-
ter a particular reading test.21 
 After multiple fruitless appeals asking LSAC to reconsider, 
Rothberg opted not to take the LSAT that December.22 Instead, she vis-
ited another psychologist who administered the required reading test; 
the second psychologist also concluded that Rothberg required addi-
tional time on standardized tests.23 
 Rothberg once again registered to take the LSAT, this time in Feb-
ruary 2004, and again applied for an accommodation, submitting 
documentation from both evaluations.24 Despite two independent di-
agnoses and her repeated efforts to satisfy LSAC, the council once 
again denied Rothberg’s request for an accommodation, stating that 
“her documentation did not demonstrate a substantial impairment re-
lated to taking the LSAT.”25 
 In each instance, LSAC’s Disabilities Specialist and Manager of Ac-
commodated Testing, Kim Dempsey, reviewed Rothberg’s accommoda-
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. at 1097. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1098. The test LSAC required is the Nelson-Denny Reading Test (NDRT). Id. 
The NDRT assesses an individual’s reading skills, including vocabulary, comprehension, and 
reading rate. See Nelson-Denny Reading Test, Riverside Publishing, http://riverpub.com/ 
products/ndrt/index.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). LSAC relies on this test because it 
regards the reading skills assessed by the NDRT as the closest match to the reading skills 
assessed by the LSAT. See Love v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 206, 222 
(E.D. Pa. 2007). 
22 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99. 
23 See id. at 1099. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 1098–99. 
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tion requests.26 At the time of her review, Dempsey was not a licensed 
psychologist nor had she achieved her clinical doctorate.27 LSAC re-
serves the right to make final judgments regarding accommodation 
requests and the only avenue for appeal is to “provide substantive sup-
plemental documentation.”28 Thus, Dempsey could overrule doctors’ 
recommendations, even though she possessed no comparable level of 
expertise.29 
 Rothberg filed a complaint against LSAC in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Colorado.30 She alleged that LSAC’s actions consti-
tuted discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) “by failing to provide her reasonable accommoda-
tion in connection with taking the [LSAT] and by failing to engage in 
an interactive process with her regarding her requested accommoda-
tion.”31 She sought a preliminary injunction ordering LSAC to allow her 
fifty percent additional time on the LSAT.32 After hearing expert testi-
mony from both sides, the district court granted Rothberg’s motion, 
finding that her processing speed inhibited her ability to process infor-
mation efficiently and that, without accommodation, her LSAT scores 
would not “accurately reflect her aptitude or achievement level.”33 
 Rothberg took the LSAT on February 7, 2004 with full accommo-
dations, but LSAC refused to report her score in the same manner as 
other test takers.34 The district court ordered LSAC to report her score, 
and LSAC filed a notice of appeal and requested a stay of the injunc-
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. at 1099. 
27 Id. 
28 See Accommodations Request Packet: General Information, LSAC 1–2, http://lsac.org/ 
JD/pdfs/AccommodationsFormGenInfo-NON.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) [hereinafter 
General Information]. 
29 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. Although Dempsey agreed with the diagnos-
ing psychologists’ finding that Rothberg had a learning disability, she disputed their con-
clusion that Rothberg was substantially impaired compared to the average person and 
warranted an accommodation on the LSAT in the form of extended time. Id. at 1100. In 
reaching her conclusion that Rothberg was not substantially impaired in her ability to take 
the LSAT, Dempsey “relied heavily on the fact that Rothberg was able to perform in the 
average range on the SAT and LSAT (although in the low range of average) without ac-
commodation.” Id. She also asserted that Rothberg’s developmental writing and arithmetic 
disorders would not impact her performance on the LSAT because “the LSAT does not 
test mathematics or actual written ability.” Id. at 1098, 1100. 
30 See id. at 1095. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 1101. The district court also found the diagnosing psychologists’ testimo-
nies to be more credible than that of Dempsey. Id. 
34 See Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (Rothberg II ), 102 F. App’x 122, 123 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
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tion.35 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted the stay 
pending appeal.36 
 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, finding 
that the balance of irreparable harms weighed against Rothberg.37 The 
court lifted the preliminary injunction noting that if the injunction 
stood, LSAC’s claim that Rothberg was not entitled to accommodation 
would be rendered moot.38 The Tenth Circuit determined that the 
harm to LSAC outweighed Rothberg’s stated harm of delayed educa-
tional plans and violation of the ADA because she could continue to 
pursue admission to law school and redress of the statutory violation, 
whereas LSAC’s injury would be permanent if forced to report her 
score.39 
 The Tenth Circuit’s ruling left Rothberg with two choices: (1) con-
tinue her litigation against LSAC, incurring additional legal expenses 
and prolonging her plans to attend law school, or (2) apply to law 
schools with a score that did not accurately reflect her intellectual abili-
ties.40 She chose the latter and graduated from Suffolk University Law 
School in 2007.41 
 Rothberg’s case raises a serious issue regarding the effectiveness of 
the ADA in protecting individuals with learning disabilities.42 This issue 
concerns the method of measuring whether an individual’s impairment 
constitutes a substantial limitation to a major life activity.43 Rothberg’s 
clinical evaluations exhibited a significant discrepancy between her 
processing speed and innate cognitive abilities, making her “‘substan-
tially impaired as compared to the average person in her ability to read 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 125–27. 
38 See id. at 126. 
39 See id. 
40 See Rothberg II, 102 F. App’x at 126–27; Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
41 See Attorneys: Abby Rothberg Dvorkin, Cardi, Schulte & Ford, LLC, http://www.csf-
legal.com/English/Attorneys/Dvorkin_Abby.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
42 See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006) 
(stating that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities); see, e.g., Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 324 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (ruling in favor of a bar applicant’s accommodation on the bar exam, later va-
cated by the Supreme Court), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Love, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 228 
(ruling that an individual with a reading impairment was not substantially limited in his 
ability to read and learn as compared to the average person). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability”); see Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 
1099–1100 (featuring two different ways of measuring an impairment in the standardized 
testing context that led to separate outcomes). 
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and process information.’”44 LSAC claimed that this impairment did 
not substantially impair her ability to take the LSAT because she was 
able to perform in the average range when taking the test without ac-
commodation.45 Courts have taken both sides of this argument, with 
varying outcomes.46 The ambiguity over what constitutes a substantial 
limitation creates uncertainty as to which line of reasoning a court 
might adopt in a given case and leaves individuals like Rothberg in the 
difficult position of choosing between rolling the dice with litigation or 
simply moving on with their lives.47 
 Proponents on both sides articulate meritorious positions.48 On 
one hand, testing institutions articulate the need to preserve the aca-
demic integrity of objective measurements of ability, like the LSAT, 
from the potential erosion of their standardized format as more stu-
dents qualify for accommodations.49 On the other hand, disability ad-
vocates argue that comparing disabled students to the average person 
restricts them from achieving their true potential.50 
 Regardless of normative policy concerns, disabled people like 
Rothberg are at the mercy of institutions like LSAC when they apply for 
an accommodation.51 By reserving the right to make the final judg-
ment of whether an individual’s disability warrants accommodation, 
LSAC retains the power to overrule diagnoses of licensed psychologists 
and clinical experts.52 Thus, disabled applicants must resort to the ex-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. 
45 See id. at 1100. 
46 Compare Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 629 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(comparing a disabled person’s ability to that of an average person), with Bartlett v. N.Y. 
State Bd. of Law Exam’rs (Bartlett I ), 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (comparing 
a disabled person’s ability to that of an average law school graduate), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). 
47 See Rothberg II, 102 F. App’x at 126–27 (finding that LSAC’s claim that Rothberg was 
not entitled to accommodation still warranted consideration despite the district court’s 
finding that she was entitled to accommodation); Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
48 Compare Nicholas L. Townsend, Framing a Ceiling as a Floor: The Changing Definition of 
Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends in Legislation Affecting Learning Disabled Stu-
dents, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 229, 232 (2007) (arguing against using the higher, more ex-
clusive average person standard), with Craig S. Lerner, “Accommodations” for the Learning 
Disabled: A Level Playing Field or Affirmative Action for Elites?, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1043, 1046–47 
(2004) (arguing in favor of a higher, more exclusive average person standard). 
49 See Lerner, supra note 48, at 1046–47. 
50 See Townsend, supra note 48, at 232. 
51 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1099–1100. 
52 See id.; General Information, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
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pensive and time consuming judicial process, an inequity that pits them 
against a corporation with vast resources.53 
 This Note examines LSAC’s accommodation requests process and 
highlights the void that exists in the dispute process upon the denial of 
such requests. It recommends implementation of an independent 
third-party review that is more accessible than federal district courts. 
Part I examines the history of the ADA, including Congress’s passage of 
amendments in 2008 as a response to the courts’ interpretation of the 
initial legislation. Part II focuses on how courts have employed conflict-
ing interpretations of the ADA to cases concerning learning disabilities. 
Part III analyzes the history of the LSAT as an objective measurement 
of academic ability and discusses the LSAC’s review process for accom-
modation requests. Finally, Part IV addresses the due process problem 
surrounding quasi-state actors and advocates for impartial review in 
LSAC’s accommodation request process. This independent review 
could, for example, be implemented through administrative agency 
review or arbitration. 
I. The History of the ADA 
 Congress drafted the ADA to establish a “national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;” how-
ever, the Act’s ambiguous language led to contrasting findings of law by 
various courts after its passage.54 This ambiguity inspired Congress to 
pass several amendments to the ADA in 2008 in an effort to clarify the 
statutory language; it is still unclear how courts will apply these amend-
ments.55 
                                                                                                                      
 
53 See Rothberg II, 102 F. App’x at 126–27 (finding that plaintiff’s delayed educational 
plans did not outweigh the injury to defendant); Law School Admission Council, Inc., 
Form 990, Foundation Center 9 (2009), http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org//990_pdf_ 
archive/132/132998164/132998164_201006_990.pdf (showing that LSAC generated over 
seventy million dollars in total revenue in 2009). 
54 See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006); see, 
e.g., Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (Rothberg I ), 300 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105–
07 (D. Colo. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s learning disability was substantially limiting in 
processing information and thus she was disabled under the law despite a previous LSAT 
score in the low average range), rev’d, 102 F. App’x 122 (10th Cir. 2004); Price v. Nat’l Bd. of 
Med. Exam’rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 427 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (finding that plaintiffs were not sub-
stantially limited in learning, and thus, not disabled under the law because their prior aca-
demic success showed that they could learn at least as well as the average person). 
55 See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 
3553, 3553–54 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); Herzog v. 
Loyola Coll. in Md., Inc., No. RDB-07-02416, 2009 WL 3271246, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 
2009) (applying the higher standard set forth in the former version of the ADA instead of 
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A. Legislative Background and Statutory Construction 
 In 1990, Congress passed the ADA to protect those with disabilities 
from discrimination in places of public accommodation.56 Congress 
found that disabled individuals “occupy an inferior status in our soci-
ety” and concluded that unlike victims of racial, gender, ethnic, reli-
gious, or age discrimination, the disabled generally had no recourse for 
addressing discrimination against them.57 This discrimination takes 
various forms, including “failure to make modifications to existing fa-
cilities and practices, [and] exclusionary qualification standards and 
criteria . . . .”58 In passing the ADA, Congress invoked authority con-
ferred on it by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”59 
 Congress organized the ADA into five titles; testing institutions are 
subject to Title III, which covers private persons and groups that operate 
places or entities of public accommodation.60 Thus, organizations like 
LSAC are subject to the ADA as places of public accommodation be-
cause they “offer[] examinations or courses related to applications, li-
censing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or post-secondary 
education . . . .”61 
 Under the ADA, courts may provide injunctive relief if discrimina-
tory actions are taken against a disabled plaintiff.62 Defendants dis-
                                                                                                                      
the more inclusive standard mandated by the amendments); Singh v. George Washington 
Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., 597 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing plaintiff’s 
prior academic success as dispositive of her disability despite the ADAAA’s mandate for a 
more inclusive standard), aff’d, 667 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also M. Patrick Yingling, 
Learning Disabilities and the ADA: Licensing Exam Accommodations in the Wake of the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 291, 306 (2011) (“What is yet to be seen is the 
extent to which the courts will incorporate and acknowledge the ADAAA’s legislative his-
tory with respect to the rights of individuals with learning disabilities.”). 
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), 12182(a). 
57 Id. § 12101(a)(4), (a)(6). 
58 Id. § 12101(a)(5). 
59 See id. § 12101(b)(1). 
60 See id. §§ 12181(7), 12189; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. 
101-336, § 301, 104 Stat. 327, 353–54 (1990); Townsend, supra note 48, at 236–37 (discuss-
ing the five titles of the ADA). Title I concerns employers, requiring non-discriminatory 
hiring practices and reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities; Title II 
mandates access for disabled persons to government services such as education and voting; 
Title IV requires access to telecommunication services; and Title V forbids retaliation 
against disabled individuals asserting their rights under the ADA. See Townsend, supra note 
48, at 236–37. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 12189; Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
62 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. 
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criminate when they fail to make “reasonable accommodations to . . . 
known physical or mental limitations . . . .”63 Upon showing a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory justification for their actions, however, de-
fendants can demonstrate that they have not discriminated against the 
disabled plaintiff.64 
 To prevail, a plaintiff must show that he or she is disabled under 
the meaning of the statute, that the request for accommodation is rea-
sonable, and that the defendant denied that request.65 The ADA de-
fines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities . . . .”66 This definition estab-
lishes “a three-part inquiry” when considering whether a plaintiff’s as-
serted disability is covered by the ADA: (1) does the plaintiff suffer 
from a physical or mental impairment; (2) does that impairment affect 
a major life activity; and (3) is the plaintiff substantially limited in that 
major life activity?67 
 The statute addresses the meaning of “major life activity” through 
an extensive but not exhaustive list of actions and bodily functions in-
cluding “learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, 
and working.”68 The statute does not define “physical or mental im-
pairment” or “substantially limits.”69 For further clarity regarding this 
issue, courts typically turn to regulatory definitions issued by the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) for Title III claims.70 The DOJ defines a 
mental impairment as “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as 
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill-
ness, and specific learning disabilities.”71 
                                                                                                                      
63 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
64 See Herzog, 2009 WL 3271246, at *8 (finding that defendant did not discriminate be-
cause it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for dismissing the disabled student). 
65 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
67 Dylan Gallagher, Note, Wong v. Regents of the University of California: The ADA, 
Learning Disabled Students, and the Spirit of Icarus, 16 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 153, 155–56 
(2005). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
69 Suzanne Wilhelm, “Is Someone Riding Around a Golf Course from Shot to Shot Really a 
Golfer?” The Supreme Court Determines the Essence of the Game of Golf—and What the Decision 
Could Mean for Learning Disabled Students in Higher Education, 32 J.C. & U.L. 579, 584 (2006) 
(stating that the ADA does not define “physical or mental impairment” or “substantially 
limits”). 
70 See id.; Ali A. Aalaei, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Law School Accommo-
dations: Test Modifications Despite Anonymity, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 419, 423–24 (2007) (es-
tablishing that DOJ-issued regulations assist courts in interpreting the ADA). 
71 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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 The DOJ does not define “substantially limits.”72 Consequently, the 
only guidance as to what this term means comes from the regulatory 
definition issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) for Title I claims, which defines “substantially limits” as affect-
ing “the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as com-
pared to most people in the general population.”73 The regulation 
states that this term should “be construed broadly in favor of expansive 
coverage,” and that “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly 
or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity 
. . . .”74 Even with this expansive understanding of “substantially limits,” 
the regulation states that “not every impairment will constitute a disabil-
ity . . . .”75 This definition’s ambiguity coupled with the absence of any 
definition from the DOJ’s regulations has led to inconsistent application 
of the ADA across the federal judicial structure and has proven to be the 
biggest obstacle for disabled individuals in asserting their rights.76 
B. Early Cases and Interpretations 
 Courts struggled with the ambiguity of the term “substantially lim-
its” in initial ADA cases, which resulted in contradictory findings.77 In 
one of the first cases to address the issue, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of New York relied on the treating physician’s recom-
                                                                                                                      
72 See id. § 35.104. 
73 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2011); Aalaei, supra note 70, at 423–24 (establishing 
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued regulations to assist courts in 
interpreting the ADA). 
74 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
75 Id. 
76 See Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 629 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding 
plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major life activity because his previous perform-
ance on standardized tests without accommodations proved that he could read “as well as 
the average person”). Compare Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 480–93 (1999) 
(finding plaintiffs were not substantially limited in a major life activity, and therefore not 
disabled under the ADA, because of the use of corrective lenses), superseded by statute, ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, with Bartlett v. N.Y. St. Bd. 
of Law Exam’rs (Bartlett VI ), No. 93 CIV. 4986(SS), 2001 WL 930792, at *36–37 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 15, 2001) (finding plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of read-
ing as compared to most people despite the existence of mitigating measures). 
77 See Yingling, supra note 55, at 296 (stating that early cases involving ADA claims con-
cerned questions of how to interpret the ADA’s ambiguous terms). Compare Price, 966 F. 
Supp. at 424 (finding the defendant’s expert testimony was more compelling than that of 
the plaintiff resulting in the finding that plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major 
life activity), with D’Amico v. N.Y. St. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 813 F. Supp. 217, 223 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993) (relying on plaintiff’s expert testimony over the defendant’s in finding that he was 
substantially limited in a major life activity and thus entitled to his requested accommoda-
tion). 
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mendation in concluding that the plaintiff’s visual disability was sub-
stantially limiting, as reading for extended periods of time resulted in 
blurring, tearing, and burning sensations.78 The court thus required 
the defendant to provide the plaintiff with the physician’s recom-
mended accommodations “[i]n order to demonstrate her abilities on 
an equal basis.”79 A few years later, however, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of West Virginia found that the defendant’s ex-
perts were more credible than the treating physician and consequently 
held that the plaintiffs were not substantially limited because their aca-
demic histories exhibited academic success without accommodation.80 
 The Supreme Court addressed this controversial ambiguity in 1999 
when it decided three cases commonly known as “the Sutton Trilogy.”81 
The Court held in these cases that any mitigating measures taken by 
individuals to reduce the effects of their disabilities must be considered 
in determining whether they are substantially limited in a major life 
activity and are therefore legally disabled.82 
 These three decisions appreciably narrowed ADA protections by 
requiring courts to consider the actions taken by disabled individuals to 
consciously or subconsciously reduce the effect of their disabilities on 
their lives.83 Thus, if plaintiffs are able to compensate for their disabili-
ties with the help of auxiliary aids or corrective measures such that they 
are no longer substantially limited, courts will deny them ADA protec-
tion even if discriminated against based on their disabilities.84 These 
holdings continued to inform lower courts’ decisions regarding ADA 
claims until 2008, when Congress took action to reverse this unin-
tended narrowing effect.85 
                                                                                                                      
 
78 See D’Amico, 813 F. Supp. at 218–19. 
79 Id. at 222–23. 
80 See Price, 966 F. Supp. at 424, 427–28. 
81 See Gallagher, supra note 67, at 156. 
82 See Yingling, supra note 55, at 297–98; Gallagher, supra note 67, at 156. 
83 See Yingling, supra note 55, at 298. 
84 See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567, 578 (1999); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized in Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231 
(5th Cir. 2010); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488–89; see also Townsend, supra note 48, at 241–42 
(“Sutton might imply that a history of adequate self-accommodation precludes finding a 
learning disability.”). 
85 See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 
3553, 3553–54 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); N.Y. St. Bd. 
of Law Exam’rs v. Bartlett, 527 U.S. 1031, 1031–32 (1999) (ordering the Second Circuit to 
further consider its finding in light of the Court’s findings from the Sutton Trilogy); Wong 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding plaintiff was 
not substantially limited in the major life activity of learning because of his prior academic 
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C. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
 Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) in 
direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Sutton v. United Air 
Lines.86 Congress found that the holding “narrowed the broad scope of 
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating pro-
tection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”87 
Specifically, the Court’s definition of “substantially limits” was “inconsis-
tent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.”88 
Consequently, Congress drafted the ADAAA to reject the Court’s stan-
dard and reinstate a more expansive scope of protection under the 
ADA.89 
 Congress achieved this purpose, in part, by constructing a list of 
rules to be applied when courts make findings of disability.90 One rule 
mandates that courts construe the definition of disability “to the maxi-
mum extent permitted by the terms of [the] Act.”91 Another rule di-
rects that “substantially limits” be “interpreted consistently with the 
findings and purpose” of the ADAAA.92 A third rule commands that, in 
determining whether an individual is substantially limited, courts can-
not consider mitigating measures, including medication, assistive tech-
nology, reasonable accommodations, or “learned behavioral or adap-
tive neurological modifications.”93 
 The ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009, and much remains to 
be seen as to how the Supreme Court and lower courts will interpret 
these amendments in the varying contexts of different disabilities.94 
                                                                                                                      
performance without accommodation); Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 629 (finding plaintiff was not 
substantially limited because “he [could] read as well as the average person”); see also 
Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 Ind. L.J. 187, 
201–02 (2010) (stating the ADA Amendments reject the Supreme Court’s restrictive inter-
pretations of the ADA); Yingling, supra note 55, at 306 (stating that the ADA Amendments 
explicitly reject the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “substantially limits”). 
86 See § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553. 
87 Id. § 2(a)(4). 
88 Id. § 2(a)(8). 
89 Id. 
90 See id. § 4(a)(3)(4). Additionally, Congress struck language from the original draft 
that the Supreme Court relied on in denying protection for disabled individuals with cor-
rectable conditions. See Yingling, supra note 55, at 305–06. It also incorporated an exten-
sive, non-exhaustive list of activities considered “major life activities,” as applied to the 
statutory definition of disability. See § 4(a)(3)(2); Yingling, supra note 55, at 306. 
91 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a)(3)(4)(A), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (Supp. II 2008)). 
92 Id. § 4(a)(3)(4)(B). 
93 Id. § 4(a)(3)(4)(E). 
94 See Cox, supra note 85, at 188–89. 
2013] LSAC’s Disability Accommodation Review Process & the ADA 195 
Regardless of the surviving ambiguities in the ADAAA, Congress made 
one thing clear: the courts got it wrong the first time around.95 
II. Application of the ADA to Learning Disabilities 
 The scope of ADA protection covers individuals with learning dis-
abilities.96 The ambiguous statutory phrase “substantially limits” has 
proved problematic, however, because courts have employed at least 
two different lines of reasoning in determining whether a learning im-
pairment constitutes a disability under the Act.97 Although educational 
testing organizations like LSAC fear that a spike in accommodation re-
quests will compromise their academic integrity, ample opportunity 
exists for these institutions to defend their integrity under the law.98 
A. ADA Claims Concerning Learning Disabilities 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines 
the term “learning disability” as a broad range of mental disorders, in-
cluding Reading Disorder, Mathematics Disorder, and Disorder of Writ-
ten Expression.99 The basic definition incorporates two elements: (1) a 
“substantial discrepancy” between innate intelligence and academic 
achievement; and (2) a neurological basis for this discrepancy.100 
 The most common of these disabilities is Reading Disorder, oth-
erwise known as dyslexia.101 Dyslexia typically exists in students who 
                                                                                                                      
95 See § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553. 
96 See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. 
II 2008); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B) (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011). 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1)(A); Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (Rothberg 
I ), 300 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105–06 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d, 102 F. App’x 122 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Price v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 427–28 (S.D. W. Va. 1997). 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 
620, 630–32 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling in favor of the testing institution); Price, 966 F. Supp. at 
427–28 (same); Lerner, supra note 48, at 1105. 
99 See Suzanne E. Rowe, Learning Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act: The 
Conundrum of Dyslexia and Time, 15 J. Legal Writing Inst. 165, 174 (2009). The Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders “is the standard classification of mental 
disorders used by mental health professionals in the United States.” DSM, American Psy-
chiatric Ass’n, http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/Research/DSMIV.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2012). It is commonly cited by the courts as an authoritative source when consid-
ering the varying elements of learning disabilities. See Love v. Law Sch. Admission Council, 
Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Bartlett v. N.Y. St. Bd. of Law Exam’rs (Bart-
lett VI ), No. 93 CIV. 4986(SS), 2001 WL 930792, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001); Gucken-
berger v. Bos. Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 132 (D. Mass. 1997). 
100 See Rowe, supra note 99, at 175. 
101 Id. at 174. 
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exhibit high IQ scores but struggle with basic reading skills.102 Thus, an 
unexpected discrepancy exists between dyslexic students’ overall intel-
ligence and their reading ability.103 Dyslexic students are distinguished 
from other poorly performing students because they exhibit high cog-
nitive ability in other areas and something other than low intelligence 
inhibits their performance with written language.104 
 The ADA does not directly mention learning disabilities in its text, 
but the EEOC and DOJ incorporated “specific learning disabilities” 
into their definitions of mental impairments covered under Titles I and 
III of the ADA.105 The ADA’s coverage of learning disabled individuals 
is largely undisputed.106 Instead, the locus of dispute centers on 
whether mentally impaired individuals are substantially limited in ma-
jor life activities, and thus, whether their conditions are cognizable dis-
abilities under the ADA.107 Courts have employed two different lines of 
reasoning in determining whether a learning disabled individual is sub-
stantially limited: (1) whether the disability inhibits the individual in a 
major life activity as compared to the average person; or (2) whether 
the disability inhibits the individual in the major life activity as com-
pared to the average person of the same achievement level.108 
 Courts have emphasized these two lines of reasoning to varying 
degrees during the course of the ADA’s evolution, creating significant 
uncertainty for potential litigants as to the types of learning disabilities 
that are protected under the ADA.109 In 1997, in Price v. National Board 
                                                                                                                      
 
102 See id. at 175. 
103 See id. at 175–76. 
104 See id. 
105 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B) (2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2011); see also 
Yingling, supra note 55, at 293 (stating that while the text of the ADA does not clearly 
cover learning disabilities, the implementing regulations clarifies their coverage “under 
the ADA’s umbrella of protection”). 
106 See Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 626 (defendant did not dispute the ADA’s applicability to 
learning disabilities); Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (same); Price, 966 F. Supp. at 424 
(defendant agreed that ADHD, Disorder of Written Expression, and Reading Disorder 
were mental impairments covered under the ADA). 
107 See Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 626; Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; Price, 966 F. Supp. at 
424. 
108 Compare Bartlett v. N.Y. St. Bd. of Law Exam’rs (Bartlett I ), 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1126 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (demonstrating the second line of reasoning in finding that plaintiff was 
substantially limited in reading as compared to the average law student), aff’d in part, va-
cated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999), with Price, 966 F. 
Supp. at 427–28 (demonstrating the first line of reasoning in explaining that “there is a 
complete lack of evidence suggesting that plaintiffs cannot learn at least as well as the av-
erage person”). 
109 See, e.g., Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 629 (adopting the first line of reasoning in finding 
that plaintiff’s impairment did not substantially limit him because he could read as well as 
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of Medical Examiners, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
West Virginia concluded that individuals must show that they are sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity “as compared with most peo-
ple.”110 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show this due, in 
part, to their previous academic success without accommodations.111 
While the court noted that the plaintiffs had difficulty learning, it 
found their claims were unfounded because they exhibited above aver-
age intellectual ability without accommodation and could learn “at 
least as well as the average person.”112 
 This reasoning was contradicted less than a month later when the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued its opin-
ion in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners.113 The court found 
that the plaintiff, a bar applicant, was disabled because she was not able 
to “read in the same condition, manner, or duration as other law stu-
dents” despite her inconsistent history of accommodation.114 The court 
reasoned that, when considering whether she was substantially limited, 
the proper comparison is not to the average person in the general 
population but to the “‘average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities.’”115 As a result, even though the plaintiff could read 
and learn at least as well as the average person—as evidenced by her 
non-accommodated performance in college and graduate school—she 
was still substantially limited as compared to the average law student and 
thus was disabled under the definition of the ADA.116 
 After the Supreme Court decided its Sutton Trilogy cases, courts 
continued to employ both lines of reasoning, arriving at contrasting 
conclusions of law.117 This ambiguity inspired Congress to pass the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).118 During deliberations regarding 
                                                                                                                      
the average person); Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (agreeing with Bartlett I in adopting 
the second line of reasoning). 
110 See Price, 966 F. Supp. at 428. 
111 See id. at 427–28. 
112 See id. 
113 See Bartlett I, 970 F. Supp. at 1126. 
114 See id. at 1101–04, 1126. 
115 See id. at 1120 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2011)). 
116 See id. at 1120, 1126. 
117 Compare Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 629 (finding plaintiff’s impairment did not substan-
tially limit him because he could read as well as the average person), with Rothberg I, 300 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1104–05 (finding plaintiff was substantially limited despite her average, non-
accommodated performance on the LSAT). 
118 See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(3)–(6), 
122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); 
Yingling, supra note 55, at 304. 
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the ADAAA, the Committee on Education and Labor rejected the rea-
soning in Price, concluding that prior academic success without ac-
commodation does not preclude a finding of a disability.119 
 While Congress expected the ADAAA to better protect the learn-
ing disabled, the two cases decided in its aftermath declined to apply 
the broadened scope and instead resorted to the reasoning found in 
Price.120 It remains to be seen whether future courts will continue to 
ignore this mandate and the instructive legislative history or whether 
they will adopt reasoning more consistent with the purpose of the 
ADAAA, leaving prospective plaintiffs and defendants with a great deal 
of uncertainty.121 
B. The Debate Over Accommodations for Students with Learning Disabilities 
 Critics argue that accommodations like “extra time on exams, dis-
traction free environments for testing, and course waivers . . . would aid 
all students and therefore, give disabled students an unfair competitive 
advantage and ultimately result in lowering the educational bar.”122 
One common refrain in this argument is that granting accommoda-
tions compromises the academic integrity of educational institutions by 
affording an advantage to students purporting to have disabilities in 
order to cheat the system to gain preferential treatment.123 
 Educational institutions have the right to protect their academic 
integrity and the courts have recognized the importance of allowing 
institutions to determine and maintain appropriate standards.124 The 
                                                                                                                      
119 See Yingling, supra 55, at 306 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 110-730(I), pt. 1, at 10 (2008)). 
120 See § 2(b)(1)–(2), 122 Stat. at 3553; Herzog v. Loyola Coll. in Md., Inc., No. RDB-
07-02416, 2009 WL 3271246, at *6–7 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2009); Singh v. George Washington 
Univ. Sch. of Med. and Health Scis., 597 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 667 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
121 See § 2(b)(1)–(2), 122 Stat. at 3553; Herzog, 2009 WL 3271246, at *6–7; Singh, 597 F. 
Supp. 2d at 95; H.R. Rep. No. 110-730(I), pt. 1, at 10; see also Yingling, supra note 55, at 306 
(“What is yet to be seen is the extent to which the courts will incorporate and acknowledge 
the ADAAA’s legislative history with respect to the rights of individuals with learning dis-
abilities.”). 
122 See Wilhelm, supra note 69, at 580. 
123 See Lerner, supra note 48, at 1075; Wilhelm, supra note 69, at 580. 
124 See, e.g., Axelrod v. Phillips Acad., Andover, 46 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(“Courts have neither the authority nor the expertise to prescribe academic standards . . . 
Phillips Academy has quite properly set high academic standards for its students.”); Bartlett 
I, 970 F. Supp. at 1131 (“[D]eference is due a state in determining the qualifications an 
individual needs to practice law in that state.”); Price, 966 F. Supp. at 422 (“[T]esting ac-
commodations to persons that do not have disabilities within the meaning of the ADA . . . 
would allow persons to advance to professional positions through the proverbial back 
door.”). 
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purpose of the ADA, however, is not to usurp “the integrity of stan-
dards.”125 Instead, the law strikes “a balance between the rights of the 
disabled individual to be integrated and the legitimate interest of the 
academic institution in preserving the integrity of their programs.”126 
 One way in which the law strikes this balance is by setting a high 
standard of proof for plaintiffs to qualify as disabled under the ADA.127 
One may not merely assert a disability, but must show that he or she is 
substantially limited in a major life activity.128 For the purposes of estab-
lishing a learning disability, this means undertaking an extensive proc-
ess that includes a battery of psychometric tests conducted by a licensed 
professional and accumulating sufficient data to support this asser-
tion.129 Indeed, institutions retain the right to set reasonable standards 
requiring an individual “to provide current documentation from a 
qualified professional concerning his learning disability.”130 
 In addition, the EEOC’s regulations state that “not every impair-
ment will constitute a disability” under the ADA.131 Courts take seri-
ously the inquiry of whether an impairment substantially limits a major 
life activity and routinely rule in favor of defendants when plaintiffs fail 
to show this limitation.132 Thus, there is ample opportunity for institu-
tions to defend their academic integrity within the construction of the 
ADA without abolishing the practice of accommodating the learning 
disabled.133 
III. The Law School Admissions Council 
 LSAC, the corporation responsible for administering the LSAT, 
was formed in the late 1940s and in the ensuing decades has grown into 
a multi-million dollar entity.134 LSAC enumerates several requirements 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Jeff Brown, A Learning-Disabled Lawyer’s Perspective: A Response to “Lowering the Bar” 
Integrity, Stereotypical Attitudes and Reasonable Accommodations, 42 S. Tex. L. Rev. 129, 132, 136 
(2000). 
126 See id. at 136. 
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
128 See id. § 12102(1)(A). 
129 See Bartlett I, 970 F. Supp. at 1104–09 (listing various tests administered to plaintiff 
in diagnosing her learning disability). 
130 See Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 135. 
131 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2011). 
132 See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Singh, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 95; Price, 966 F. Supp. at 427–28. 
133 See Brown, supra note 125, at 136. 
134 See About LSAC, LSAC, http://lsac.org/AboutLSAC/about-lsac.asp (last visited Dec. 
30, 2012); Form 990, supra note 53, at 9 (showing that LSAC generated over seventy million 
dollars in total revenue for 2009). 
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that submitting parties must meet in requesting an accommodation for 
the LSAT.135 LSAC reserves the right to make all final determinations 
regarding accommodation requests but it does not provide any infor-
mation as to what makes its employees more qualified to make these 
judgments over other professionals.136 Consequently, this inequity re-
sults in a legal disadvantage for individuals disputing the denials issued 
to them.137 
A. The Rise of LSAC 
 The advent of standardized testing arose out of a recognition that 
intelligence measurements should account for externalities beyond an 
individual’s control, like social class or place of birth, through an objec-
tive mechanism that focuses on innate mental aptitude.138 In 1930, law 
schools began experimenting with the idea of an admissions test “ex-
plicitly designed to supplement other criteria and especially to provide 
some control on the wide variation in the meaning of college re-
cords.”139 Later that year, deans from several law schools met in Prince-
ton to discuss the test, constituting the first meeting of a new organiza-
tion of law schools that would come to be known as the Law School 
Admission Council (LSAC).140 
 LSAC is a nonprofit corporation that provides “services to ease the 
admission process for law schools and their applicants worldwide.”141 
Originally, LSAC oversaw the administration of the LSAT, but the in-
                                                                                                                      
135 See Accommodations Request Packet: Guidelines for Documentation of Cognitive Impairments, 
LSAC 1–4, http://lsac.org/JD/pdfs/GuidelinesCognitive-NON.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 
2012) [hereinafter Guidelines for Documentation of Cognitive Impairments]. 
136 General Information, supra note 28, at 2; see Testing Accommodations for Candidates with 
Disabilities, LSAC 7 (2011), http://lsac.org/JD/pdfs/accommodatebrochure.pdf. 
137 See Badgley v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. CIV.A. 4:99CV-0103-M, 2000 
WL 33225418, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2000) (finding LSAC did not clearly indicate why 
plaintiff failed to meet its standards for accommodation); Letter from Accommodated 
Testing, LSAC, to author (Aug. 20, 2009) (on file with author) (citing that all psychomet-
ric test scores fell between the low-average to very superior range and thus the applicant 
did not warrant accommodation but failing to provide any clinical analysis refuting the 
evaluator’s determination of a learning disorder and a need for accommodation); E-mail 
from Accommodated Testing, LSAC, to author (Aug. 21, 2009, 17:26 EST) (on file with 
author). 
138 See Lerner, supra note 48, at 1094–96. 
139 See William P. LaPiana, Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor, New York Law School, 
Keynote Address at 1998 LSAC Annual Meeting (May 28, 1998), in A History of the Law 
School Admission Council and the LSAT 1, 1 (2001), available at http://www.lsac.org/ 
LSACResources/Publications/PDFs/history-lsac-lsat.pdf. 
140 See id. at 5–6. 
141 See About LSAC, supra note 134. 
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come from the rapidly growing test allowed LSAC to expand its ser-
vices, eventually leading to a complete online law school application 
apparatus.142 
 LSAC’s most valuable service, however, remains the administration 
of the LSAT and the test’s rise to prominence as an integral component 
of the law school application process fostered LSAC’s significant finan-
cial growth.143 The size of the LSAT’s administration grew substantially 
in the ensuing decades after its initial offering in 1948, and LSAC’s 
membership mirrored that expansion.144 LSAC administers more than 
150,000 tests annually and its membership consists of over 200 law 
schools in the United States, Canada, and Australia, including every law 
school approved by the American Bar Association (ABA).145 In 2009, 
LSAC generated revenue totaling $51,298,416 with $31,562,502 deriv-
ing from registration fees for the LSAT.146 With only $5,468,425 in test-
ing administration expenses, LSAC increased its overall net worth that 
year by almost $20,000,000 with assets totaling $191,161,595.147 
B. LSAC’s Accommodation Review Process 
 LSAC requires extensive documentation from individuals with 
learning disabilities requesting accommodation for the LSAT.148 This 
documentation is necessary to establish that an individual’s asserted 
impairment affects a major life activity, and therefore his or her ability 
to take the LSAT under standard conditions.149 As part of its regula-
tions implementing the ADA, the DOJ supports such requirements for 
documentation provided that they are “reasonable and limited to the 
need for the modification, accommodation, or auxiliary aid or service 
requested.”150 
 LSAC’s required documentation consists of a psychoeducational 
evaluation conducted by a diagnostician with “comprehensive training 
                                                                                                                      
142 See LaPiana, supra note 139, at 6; About LSAC, supra note 134. This apparatus consists 
of the Credential Assembly Service and the Candidate Referral Service. See About LSAC, supra 
note 134. 
143 See About LSAT, LSAC, http://lsac.org/JD/LSAT/about-the-LSAT.asp (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2012); Form 990, supra note 53, at 9. 
144 See LaPiana, supra note 139, at 1–12 (follow the timeline at the bottom of each page). 
145 See About LSAC, supra note 134. 
146 See Form 990, supra note 53, at 9. 
147 See id. 
148 See Guidelines for Documentation of Cognitive Impairments, supra note 135, at 1–4. 
149 Id. at 1. 
150 See DOJ Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations 
and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(iv) (2011). 
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and direct experience in working with adult populations.”151 The 
evaluation must include: a diagnostic interview, an aptitude assessment, 
an achievement assessment, an information processing assessment, and 
a personality assessment.152 At the conclusion of the evaluation, the di-
agnostician must author a report that incorporates the data compiled 
from the testing with his or her own clinical observations and a specific 
diagnosis of a cognitive impairment.153 The report must also explain 
the necessity of each specific accommodation requested as it pertains to 
the impairment.154 
 LSAC requires such extensive documentation because “[t]he LSAT 
is a high-stakes test” and “[i]n order to be fair to all test takers, [it] must 
ensure that [its] decisions are based on appropriate documentation 
that supports [an individual’s] right to accommodations.”155 LSAC is 
entitled to protect its most valuable asset, the LSAT, as an objective 
measurement by requiring individuals seeking accommodation to show 
functional limitations.156 The veracity of the LSAT’s objectivity relies 
entirely upon the standardized format so that the results “can be inter-
preted fairly across a broad range of candidates.”157 Thus, LSAC has an 
obligation to all of the test takers and law schools relying on these re-
sults to ensure that any deviation from the standardized format is de-
signed only to give the disabled individual a fair chance on the test and 
not an unfair advantage.158 
 LSAC’s requirements concerning documentation are clearly enu-
merated and legally supported; however, LSAC’s process of review once 
accommodation requests are properly formulated and submitted is 
much less clear.159 LSAC creates a file for every submission and moni-
tors its completeness, notifying an applicant when additional informa-
tion is required.160 Once completed, LSAC’s Accommodated Testing 
staff evaluates the submission for the appropriateness of the accommo-
                                                                                                                      
151 Guidelines for Documentation of Cognitive Impairments, supra note 135, at 1. 
152 Id. at 2. 
153 Id. at 3. 
154 Id. 
155 Accommodations Request Packet: Accommodated Testing Frequently Asked Questions, LSAC 
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dation requested and informs the applicant of its decision.161 If the ap-
plicant disagrees with LSAC’s decision, the applicant may request re-
consideration in writing by providing “substantive supplemental docu-
mentation” in addition to what was included in the initial 
submission.162 Otherwise, the decision stands, as LSAC “reserves the 
right to make final judgment concerning testing accommodations.”163 
 Although LSAC requires substantive information regarding the 
qualifications and credentials of diagnosticians evaluating individuals 
for cognitive impairments, it reveals no information in its materials de-
scribing its Accommodated Testing Department on the qualifications of 
the individuals who form its Accommodated Testing staff.164 Judicial 
decisions reveal that LSAC employed Dr. Kim Dempsey as its Disabili-
ties Specialist and Manager of Accommodated Testing as recently as 
2007 and that she was solely responsible for determining whether a re-
quest for accommodation was granted or denied.165 
 LSAC makes no mention of this position on its webpage or in its 
accompanying literature, and it is unclear whether LSAC still employs 
Dempsey in this capacity and whether she retains sole responsibility for 
granting or denying accommodation requests.166 It is also unclear 
whether Dempsey, or any other LSAC employee, possesses comparable 
“comprehensive training and direct experience in working with adult 
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(10th Cir. 2004); Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *2. 
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tions for Candidates with Disabilities, supra note 136, at 1–8. 
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populations” that LSAC demands from diagnosticians submitting re-
quests for accommodation.167 
 The system of review undertaken by the Accommodated Testing 
staff is equally perplexing to individuals requesting accommodation.168 
Dempsey’s process was uncovered before the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colorado in 2004 when it was revealed that she “relied heav-
ily on the fact that [the plaintiff] was able to perform in the average 
range on the SAT and LSAT (although in the low range of average) 
without accommodation.”169 The ADAAA and the DOJ’s subsequent 
regulations implementing the ADAAA expressly reject this reliance on 
previous academic performance as dispositive of a major life limitation 
in 2008.170 Due to LSAC’s lack of transparency in its process since the 
ADAAA’s passage, it is unclear whether LSAC still engages a similar line 
of reasoning when assessing accommodation requests.171 
 Due to its nonprofit status, LSAC is not required to disclose the 
structure of its internal organization like a federal agency or a for-profit 
corporation.172 As such, the difference between the information LSAC 
requires of the submitting parties and the lack of information it pro-
vides about its own processes presents a troubling inequity for individu-
als requesting an accommodation.173 The symptoms of learning dis-
abilities vary from person to person and experts with equivalent 
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qualifications often arrive at differing diagnostic conclusions.174 Yet, 
despite this elasticity, LSAC reserves the right to make all final deter-
minations regarding accommodation requests without providing any 
information as to what makes its employees more qualified than other 
professionals to make these judgments.175 This inequity puts individuals 
desiring to contest a denied request at a disadvantage, as they are given 
no explanation for the denial and are left to guess why LSAC made its 
determination.176 
IV. The Due Process Problem 
 LSAC’s one-sided accommodation review process runs contrary to 
traditional notions of due process because it lacks institutional trans-
parency, impartiality, and the opportunity for denied applicants to 
orally present their disputes before an independent decisionmaker.177 
LSAC is exempt from constitutional due process requirements, how-
ever, unless the coercive nature of its monopolistic position over law 
school applicants transforms its private conduct into public action.178 
Even if its conduct does not amount to that of a quasi-state actor, the 
status quo of LSAC as the final arbiter of who does or does not warrant 
accommodation offends the purpose of the ADA; the implementation 
of an impartial review process for disputes arising from the denial of 
accommodations would resolve this inequality.179 
A. The Goldberg Due Process Standard 
 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall deprive 
any of its citizens of their rights without due process of law; however, 
this guarantee only applies to state action and generally does not ex-
                                                                                                                      
174 See Gallagher, supra note 67, at 168. 
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Disabilities, supra note 136, at 7. 
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tend to the actions of private organizations.180 In 1970, in Goldberg v. 
Kelly, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision regarding the 
procedural due process rights of individuals subject to the termination 
of benefits by state action.181 The Court held that the omissions of op-
portunities to orally present evidence and confront adverse witnesses 
were “fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures.”182 
 LSAC’s accommodation review process mirrors the process at issue 
in Goldberg in that any request for reconsideration of a decision may 
only be submitted in writing without an opportunity to be heard.183 As 
was the case in Goldberg, the absence of an opportunity to be heard be-
fore an independent decisionmaker is problematic because it does not 
allow an applicant to be fully informed of the reasoning behind the 
denial of his or her rights and thus severely hampers an applicant’s abil-
ity to produce evidence in rebuttal.184 In fact, LSAC forces the appli-
cant to determine what additional information to submit for reconsid-
eration because it does not detail the reasoning behind its decisions or 
explain where a given submission fell short.185 
 The determination of whether a learning disabled individual war-
rants accommodation on the LSAT is subject to the credibility of both 
the submitting and deciding parties.186 The fact that some of LSAC’s 
own disabilities specialists’ diagnoses were previously rejected by differ-
                                                                                                                      
180 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action but 
generally not to private conduct “no matter how unfair that conduct may be”). 
181 See 397 U.S. at 255. 
182 Id. at 268. 
183 See id. at 258–59; General Information, supra note 28, at 2 (requiring any request for 
reconsideration of a decision be in writing and provide substantive supplemental docu-
mentation). 
184 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266; Badgley v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. 
CIV.A. 4:99CV-0103-M, 2000 WL 33225418, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2000) (finding LSAC 
did not clearly define what additional information was required of plaintiff to secure ac-
commodation). 
185 See Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *2; General Information, supra note 28, at 2 (re-
quiring any request for reconsideration of a decision provide substantive supplemental 
documentation); E-mail from Accommodated Testing to author, supra note 137 (respond-
ing to a request for reconsideration by stating that the evaluator will need to determine 
what additional documentation is required for accommodation, but failing to respond to 
the applicant’s specific inquiries). 
186 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (finding that credibility was at issue in termination pro-
ceedings); Love v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 206, 228 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (finding plaintiff’s impairment did not amount to a disability that warranted ac-
commodation on the LSAT); Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. (Rothberg I ), 
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ent courts draws into question the reliability of its review process.187 
Furthermore, LSAC’s role as the final arbiter of who warrants an ac-
commodation presents a possible conflict of interest because of its in-
centive to minimize the quantity of granted accommodation requests to 
preserve the LSAT’s functional value as an objective measurement of 
ability.188 
 Given the varying nature of learning disabilities and the fact that 
experts can reasonably disagree over a diagnosis, it would appear, as the 
Court found in Goldberg, that an impartial decisionmaker is essential in 
settling disputes over LSAC’s determinations regarding accommoda-
tion requests.189 
 Unlike in Goldberg, however, LSAC is a private corporation and thus 
is not subject to the same procedural due process standards as state ac-
tors.190 An exception for private conduct exists when the nature of the 
conduct is so closely related to a state apparatus that it essentially as-
sumes a public character.191 The Supreme Court stated in 2001, in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, that 
some private organizations may be held to procedural due process stan-
dards when “there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as 
that of the State itself.’”192 Thus, if LSAC’s accommodation request 
process is subject to any due process standard, the corporation must be 
considered as public in character through its relation to the state.193 
B. The Case for LSAC as a Quasi-State Actor 
 In Brentwood, the Supreme Court held that a nonprofit member-
ship corporation’s regulatory activity should be treated as a state action 
because of the close relationship between it and public actors, namely 
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public high schools.194 The corporation was the Tennessee Secondary 
Athletic Association (TSAA), created to regulate interscholastic sport-
ing events between public and private high schools within the state.195 
Eighty-four percent of its membership consisted of public schools and 
the Court recognized that the TSAA would not exist without public 
school officials to perform its essential functions.196 As a result, the offi-
cials’ management and control over the TSAA constituted unmistak-
able entwinement with the state, warranting that TSAA, a private or-
ganization, “be charged with a public character and judged by 
constitutional standards . . . .”197 
 LSAC is a nonprofit membership corporation like the TSAA, but its 
membership includes only eighty-one public law schools out of the 
more than two hundred law schools accredited by the ABA.198 The fact 
that public schools comprise a minority of its membership reduces 
LSAC’s level of entwinement with a governmental actor when compared 
to the public officials’ entwinement with the TSAA in Brentwood.199 Ad-
ditionally, LSAC employs private citizens to undertake its functions and 
generates sources of income by charging fees for its products and ser-
vices, distinguishing it further from the TSAA, which could not exist 
without public officials carrying out its basic functions.200 
 LSAC’s construction is more analogous to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA), which the Supreme Court found was not 
sufficiently entwined with a governmental actor to warrant a public 
characterization.201 The NCAA is a membership association comprised 
of “virtually all public and private universities and 4-year colleges con-
ducting major athletic programs in the United States.”202 
 In 1988, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, the 
Supreme Court held that this multi-state membership evidenced the 
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NCAA’s independence from any particular state.203 The Court con-
cluded that a state university is unquestionably a state actor; however, it 
does not follow that when a state university decides to adopt the 
NCAA’s standards and enforce them over university employees that the 
NCAA is then acting under the color of state law.204 Likewise, when a 
public law school decides to join LSAC and include the LSAT as a req-
uisite for admission, it does not follow that LSAC is then acting under 
the color of state law when it determines the propriety of accommoda-
tion requests.205 
 One notable distinction between Brentwood and Tarkanian is the 
Court’s consideration of coercion in analyzing whether a private action 
serves a public function.206 In Tarkanian, the Court held that even if 
NCAA’s monopolistic position over collegiate athletics enabled it to 
exert significant influence over state universities, “it does not follow 
that such a private party is therefore acting under color of state law.”207 
In Brentwood, however, the Court found that the inquiry of whether a 
private action constituted a state action incorporated a case-by-case 
analysis and that coercion is another factor, like entwinement, that 
could justify finding that a private action exhibits a public character.208 
 Given that every accredited law school in the United States re-
quires an LSAT score for admission, LSAC arguably coerces any person 
with aspirations of attending law school to comply with its rules and 
procedures regarding the administration of the LSAT.209 Furthermore, 
law schools are rated nationally based on criteria “which give an utterly 
disproportionate importance to the test scores of the entering class,” 
leading to a heightened significance surrounding an individual’s com-
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pliance with LSAC’s administration of the LSAT.210 The LSAT has 
evolved into “a precondition” of becoming a lawyer in the United States 
and LSAC’s monopolistic position as the sole administrator of this test 
makes it a de facto gate-keeper of the American legal profession.211 
 The extraordinary level of influence LSAC holds over law school 
applicants, and over an entire profession as a consequence, should sat-
isfy the Supreme Court’s fact-driven analysis concerning whether 
LSAC’s actions constitute a public function.212 Although LSAC closely 
analogizes to the NCAA in its construction, it is distinguished from the 
NCAA because of its gate-keeper position over the legal profession.213 
When Tarkanian accepted the position of basketball coach at the Uni-
versity of Nevada Las Vegas, he did so in full knowledge of the univer-
sity’s standing as a member of the NCAA.214 Logic follows that Tar-
kanian, either directly or impliedly, agreed to coach by the NCAA’s rules 
when he chose to coach at a known NCAA school.215 Thus, it was un-
surprising when the university chose to implement the NCAA’s recom-
mendations for punishment after finding Tarkanian responsible for 
numerous recruiting violations.216 Furthermore, the university council 
that ultimately approved the NCAA’s recommendations afforded Tar-
kanian the opportunity to be heard before imposing these punishments 
and Tarkanian appeared, accompanied by legal representation.217 
 Disabled individuals with career aspirations in the legal profession 
are afforded no such choice or opportunity to be heard in their deal-
ings with LSAC.218 In fact, LSAC mandates that any individual seeking 
an accommodation must first register to take the LSAT before any re-
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quest can be processed.219 For LSAC to consider a disabled individual’s 
request for accommodation, that individual must agree to the rules and 
determinations set forth by LSAC, including its reservation “to make 
final judgment concerning testing accommodations.”220 Consequently, 
disabled individuals are coerced into agreeing with LSAC’s determina-
tions regarding their accommodation requests before they even know 
what they are.221 Furthermore, when LSAC denies disabled individuals 
accommodations, they are forced to choose between forgoing their 
statutory right to compete on a level playing field with their non-
disabled counterparts or, if they can afford it, incurring the expenses of 
time and money to bring an ADA challenge in federal district court.222 
 LSAC’s reduced level of entwinement with public actors as com-
pared to that of the TSAA should not diminish any due process claim 
based on coercion because, as the Court stated: 
“Coercion” and “encouragement” are like “entwinement” in 
referring to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an os-
tensibly private action as public instead. Facts that address any 
of these criteria are significant, but no one criterion must 
necessarily be applied. When, therefore, the relevant facts 
show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlap-
ping identity, the implication of state action is not affected by 
pointing out that the facts might not loom large under a dif-
ferent test.223 
Thus, a due process claim based on a private actor’s coercive nature is 
not diminished by the absence or reduced presence of other significant 
factors.224 Therefore, if the Court were to find that LSAC’s coercive na-
ture matches that of the TSAA’s entwinement, then it could character-
ize LSAC’s private actions as public.225 
                                                                                                                      
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 2. 
221 Id. at 1–2. 
222 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2006); see Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. 
(Rothberg II ), 102 F. App’x 122, 126–27 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing that the continuance of the 
judicial process will result in a year-long delay of plaintiff’s educational plans); Turner v. 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 94, 99 (2008) (citing the trial court’s award of 
$1,969,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs in a case concerning the accommodation 
requests of four learning disabled plaintiffs for the MCAT). 
223 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
212 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:183 
 Though LSAC’s position is distinguished from that of the NCAA, 
much remains uncertain as to how the Court would view LSAC’s coer-
cive nature with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment.226 Nonethe-
less, the need for independent review outside of the federal judicial 
system in LSAC’s accommodation request process remains a key com-
ponent in ensuring that learning disabled law school applicants are 
fully afforded their rights vis–à–vis the ADA.227 
C. The Call for Impartial Review 
 The call for procedural reform gained traction recently when the 
ABA expressed its displeasure with LSAC’s accommodation request 
process.228 The ABA urged LSAC to “make its policies clear to those 
with disabilities, to give applicants decisions in a timely manner, and to 
provide adequate time for appeals of denials of accommodations.”229 By 
issuing this statement, the ABA underscored the inadequacies of LSAC’s 
process and expressed its concern over its treatment of disabled indi-
viduals, giving a powerful new voice to the call for change.230 
 LSAC’s accommodation request process empowers it to exercise 
broad authority in applying a federal law to citizens asserting their statu-
tory rights and the only check on this authority is the expensive and 
time-consuming judicial process.231 As a result, disabled individuals must 
invest significant resources in counsel, on top of other necessary invest-
ments in applying to law schools, simply to challenge LSAC’s determina-
tions in the hope that they may take the LSAT in the manner intended 
by the ADA.232 Further, disabled individuals are forced to make this in-
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vestment with no discernible probability of outcome due to the conflict-
ing interpretive history of ADA jurisprudence.233 This amounts to a sub-
stantial burden on learning disabled individuals who are denied ac-
commodations for the LSAT and left with the choice of incurring the 
costs of legal action or taking the test without accommodation: a choice 
that disadvantages them regardless of the choice they make.234 
 LSAC maintains that it receives over two thousand accommodation 
requests annually and that fifty percent are granted in some form.235 
This leaves approximately one thousand individuals who may have a 
legitimate grievance against LSAC’s determinations in a given year.236 It 
is important to note that LSAC has justifiably denied requests in the 
past and many of these individuals may choose not to contest LSAC’s 
determinations because their claims are weak or they simply agree that 
they do not suffer from a legally cognizable disability.237 Equally impor-
tant, however, is the fact that LSAC has denied accommodations to in-
dividuals with cognizable disabilities, showing that its process suffers 
from inconsistency and human error.238 Thus, a portion of the ap-
proximately one thousand individuals seeking accommodation every 
year are likely wrongly denied their statutory rights.239 
 The purpose of the ADA, particularly in light of the ADAAA’s pas-
sage in 2008, is to facilitate equal opportunity for disabled individuals 
to participate in society, including career pursuits.240 LSAC’s accom-
modation review process fails to satisfy this purpose when it denies valid 
accommodation requests because these denials effectively increase the 
LSAT’s level of difficulty for the disabled.241 By forcing adherence to 
time limits that are suitable for the information processing speeds of 
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237 See, e.g., Love, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (finding plaintiff was impaired, but not dis-
abled under the law, and therefore did not warrant accommodation on the LSAT). 
238 See, e.g., Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *3 (finding LSAC failed to provide reason-
able accommodation to disabled plaintiff). 
239 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1105–07; Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *3; Sloan, 
supra note 228. 
240 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)–(9) (2006); see ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4), (b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s narrowing definition of 
disability set forth in Sutton). 
241 See Rush v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 268 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677 (N.D. Tex. 2003). 
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non-disabled individuals but utterly unsuitable for their disabled coun-
terparts, these denials force learning disabled individuals to compete 
on an unequal playing field in direct conflict with the ADA’s express 
purpose.242 
 LSAC’s process could easily be altered to fit within the ADA’s 
mandate by allowing for an independent party to serve as the final arbi-
ter regarding whether an applicant is disabled under the law.243 The 
opportunity for a denied applicant to contest LSAC’s determinations 
would enable each side to state its case before an impartial finder of 
fact and for both sides to cross-examine adverse witnesses.244 This 
would also allow for the denied applicant to receive a detailed account 
of how LSAC arrived at its determination, providing much needed 
transparency in its review process and establishing adequate account-
ability.245 Ultimately, this would allow an independent decisionmaker to 
assess the credibility of each party’s experts, without any conflict of in-
terest, and conclude whether or not the applicant’s purported disability 
is cognizable under the ADA, therefore warranting accommodation.246 
 One solution could take the form of a quasi-judicial body housed 
in the Department of Education, like the review process incorporated 
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).247 In disputes 
arising from disagreements over placements of children in special edu-
cation programs, IDEA affords parents “an impartial due process hear-
ing” conducted by a state educational agency, including such proce-
dural safeguards as the right to present evidence and the right to 
                                                                                                                      
242 See Rothberg II, 102 F. App’x at 126 (finding the harm to LSAC outweighed the harm 
to plaintiff who was found to be disabled under the law by the district court); Rothberg I, 
300 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (finding plaintiff’s impairment restricted her ability to take the 
LSAT and that without accommodation her results would not accurately reflect her abil-
ity); Rush, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 677. 
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)–(9); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (stating that an impartial 
decisionmaker is essential for adequate due process). 
244 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268 (finding that the omission of the opportunity to present 
evidence orally and to confront adverse witnesses did not suffice due process standards). 
245 See Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *2 (finding that LSAC did not clearly define in its 
correspondence with plaintiff what additional information was required to secure an ac-
commodation on the LSAT). 
246 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269, 271; see, e.g., Love, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 222 (finding that 
while plaintiff’s processing speed was clinically significant, other indicators showed that he 
was not disabled under the law, relying in part on defense’s expert witnesses); Rothberg I, 
300 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (finding that plaintiff was disabled under the law, relying on plain-
tiff’s expert witnesses as more credible than defense’s expert witnesses). 
247 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (h) (2006) (providing due process safeguards including the 
opportunity to be heard to parents of children with disabilities who disagree with determi-
nations made by local educational agencies). 
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confront witnesses.248 The Department of Education could host a simi-
lar impartial hearing process for disputes arising from accommodation 
requests for standardized tests and licensing exams, specializing in de-
termining whether an asserted disability is cognizable under the 
ADA.249 Federal oversight of LSAC is warranted because it serves as a 
de facto gate-keeper of the legal profession and the government has a 
vested interest in ensuring that disabled individuals are afforded the 
opportunities to compete equally within this broad professional field 
pursuant to the ADA.250 
 Alternatively, a similar solution could be achieved through the em-
ployment of private arbitration services.251 LSAC could include a provi-
sion in its contract with registered test-takers that requires all controver-
sies regarding the administration of the LSAT to be settled through 
arbitration.252 Arbitration is commonly “touted as an inexpensive, 
speedy, informal, and private alternative to the judicial system.”253 While 
the prospect of private arbitrators defining disability pursuant to the 
ADA certainly evinces some concerns, LSAC can take preemptive meas-
ures to ensure that arbitration successfully serves the impartial decision-
making function.254 For instance, LSAC can ensure impartiality by re-
quiring that both parties participate in the selection of the arbitrator 
and that a different arbitrator serve in every case.255 Although arbitra-
tion may not be the most desirable solution, the increased accessibility 
of an impartial review process would certainly improve the status quo.256 
  Regardless of the form it takes, the need for independent review 
of disputes arising from LSAC’s accommodation request process is 
                                                                                                                      
248 Id. 
249 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). 
250 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)–(9); Bartlett, 970 F. Supp. at 1121; American Bar As-
sociation, supra note 209; Jacobs, supra note 209. 
251 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (establishing that a written provision in a contract for a 
commercial transaction may bind parties to arbitration arising out of controversies regard-
ing the transaction). 
252 See id. 
253 Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Profes-
sional Arbitration, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 449, 452 (2004). 
254 See id. at 451–52, 458 (stating that “parties injured by arbitral misconduct have lim-
ited recourse and effectively no remedy”). 
255 See id. at 451–52 (noting that there are thousands of individual arbitrators, that par-
ties may include provisions in their contracts regarding the use of their services, and that 
arbitration is typically defined as impartial dispute resolution by a judge mutually accepted 
by the disputing parties). 
256 See id. at 452, 458 (stating that arbitration is a speedy and informal alternative to 
the judicial system but that arbitral misconduct is effectively immune to a judicial re-
course). 
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clear.257 Just as LSAC is entitled to protect the objectivity of its test, 
learning disabled individuals are equally entitled to compete against 
their non-disabled counterparts on an equal footing.258 It seems only 
fair that disputes over accommodation requests should be fought on an 
equal footing as well, and the inclusion of an independent review proc-
ess outside of the federal judicial system would help ensure that denied 
applicants have access to an adequate remedial procedure.259 
Conclusion 
 LSAC provides an important service to the legal community by 
administering an objective measurement of ability to thousands of law 
school applicants annually. The need for objectivity in higher-education 
arose out of a counter-elitist movement that called for equal opportu-
nity in the application process. Unfortunately, and somewhat ironically, 
LSAC’s current accommodation review process achieves the opposite 
effect by forcing denied learning disabled applicants into an impossibly 
unfair decision to sue or play by LSAC’s rules. 
 The ADA was written to eliminate the barriers that disabled people 
face in becoming functional, successful, and perhaps most importantly, 
normal members of our society. As it is currently constructed, LSAC’s 
accommodation review process only exacerbates the difficulty of living 
with a disability when it denies accommodation to a disabled individual 
without proper procedural due process. Regardless of the remedial 
form, the ADA makes clear that the status quo is unacceptable and if 
we are to achieve its purpose in eliminating discrimination against the 
disabled, LSAC must be held to a higher standard. 
 
257 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (finding that an impartial decisionmaker is essential for 
adequate due process); American Bar Association, supra note 209, at 36; Jacobs, supra 
note 209; Sloan, supra note 228. 
258 See Rothberg I, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1105; Badgley, 2000 WL 33225418, at *1. 
259 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; Sloan, supra note 228 (stating that LSAC grants ac-
commodations to fifty percent of the two thousand annual accommodation requests). 
